Washington, D.C., United States (AHN) – United States officials in 1999 were pushing for a propaganda war ,especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan, against Osama bin Laden before the deadly terror attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, according to a “confidential” cable released by the WikiLeaks.
The summary of the cable noted, “It is our impression that the USG (United States Government) is not doing as well as it might projecting public diplomacy on Usama Bin Laden (UBL),” adding, “We would like to suggest that Washington consider a review of this public diplomacy effort.”
Cautioning that pending distribution of UBL “wanted” posters and matchbooks in Pakistan may increase UBL’s stature as a kind of folk hero”, the State Department cable dated January 26, 1999. noted, “We frequently hear reports that some in the lower middle and lower classes, both urban and rural, consider UBL (Usama bin Laden) an ‘Islamic Hero’, because the US has named him ‘Public Enemy Number One’.”
“That said it’s our impression that the majority of Muslims, at least in Pakistan, do not necessarily support this view,” it stressed.
The cable outlined “effective methods” for a propaganda war against bin Laden through the Voice of America language services, interviews with bin Laden’s Muslim victims, commissioned articles in the local press and by virtual presence on the Internet.
Arguing in favor of an anti-bin Laden website, the cable said, “Although that would appear to be counterintuitive – that the masses don’t use the Internet – almost all Islamic and Islamist groups do indeed have internet access and use it extensively.”
“We are unlikely to make much inroad with UBL’s hard-core supporters because they are true-believers absolutists and tend to think and react emotionally: Facts are less important to them than emotions,” it said, noting, “They are not open to persuasion.”
However, the American diplomat in Islamabad argued about a majority of Pakistanis, saying, “This middle ground, or at least somewhat susceptible to reason, or at least to other information, should be our primary target.”
“The message crafted for them would also be welcomed by educated, westward-looking elite of both Pakistan and Afghanistan, who feel threatened by UBL’s advocacy and violence and theological obscurantism,” the cable said.
“The focus of any enhanced USG public diplomacy effort should be to portray UBL and others around him as criminals, both by international and by Islamic standards. Where possible, responsibility of the movement al Qaeda should be emphasized, not just UBL (bin Laden) as an individual,” it said.
For the audiences in Afghanistan, the cable said, “When we focus on bin Laden, and especially for Afghan consumption, we should make three points: 1) The U.S. is not against Afghanistan and the Afghan people, 2) The U.S. is not against any particular any Afghan political faction, and 3) The U.S. wants UBL expelled from Afghanistan to a place where he can be brought to justice.”
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